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[For Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, 100916; rev 200916; 051016] 
 
“Courts have twisted themselves into knots”: US Copyright Protection for Applied Art 
 






 In copyright law, the marriage of beauty and utility often proves fraught. 
Domestic and international law makers have struggled to determine whether, and 
to what extent, copyright should cover works that are both artistic and functional. 
The U.S. Copyright Act protects a work of applied art "only if, and only to the 
extent that, its design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that 
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian aspects of the article." While the policy goal to separate the 
aesthetic from the functional is clear, courts' application of the statutory 
"separability" standard has become so complex and incoherent that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from a case in which the appellate 
court, echoing sister Circuits, expressed the lament quoted in the title of this 
article. The article will review the genesis and application of the statutory 
standard, with illustrations from several of the cases, and will offer two 
conclusions and a legislative proposal.    
 
First, the controversy before the Court does not concern the “design of a useful 
article," and therefore does not require the Court to resolve the meaning of 
“separability.” The controversy nonetheless reveals the importance of 
ascertaining whether the contested design is in fact the design of a “useful 
article.”  A pre-existing pictorial, graphic or sculptural work applied to a useful 
article is not itself a useful article, and courts need not “twist themselves into 
knots” endeavoring to parse the meaning of the statutory separability standard.  
Were the Supreme Court to decline to reach separability on the ground that 
resolution of the Varsity Brands dispute does not in fact require it, some might be 
disappointed that the Court would fail to tidy the disarray in the lower courts.  
But the predicate issue – what is the design of a “useful article” – also warrants 
more attention than lower courts have given it.  Thus, were the Court to leave 
separability to a case that in fact poses that issue, the Court would still contribute 
to clarifying this area of copyright law. 
 
 Second, the statutory requirements of separate identifiability and independent 
existence apply to “features” of the design, not to the entire shape of a useful 
                                                          
*
 Many thanks to Robert E. Bishop, Columbia Law School class of 2017, and to Nathalie Russell, Columbia Law 
School class of 2018, for most helpful research assistance, and to Lionel Bently, June Besek, Paul Goldstein, 
Michael Heller Rob Kasunic, Philippa Loengard, Paolo Marzano, Bill Patry and Antoon Quaedvleig for trenchant 
critiques and valuable suggestions, and to participants in staff seminars at Columbia Law School and at the 
University of Johannesburg law faculty for probing questions.  Portions of this Article are drawn from an affidavit 
on U.S. law (“Certificat de coutume”) filed (in French) in Knoll Int’l. v. M Top Mobilier, file No. 20150086, Court 
of Appeals of Paris, GR No. 15/05833.  
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article; attempts (including those ventured by this article) to extend separability 
analysis to the useful article’s form as a whole prove unworkable.  Accordingly, 
rather than continuing to struggle with an intractable statutory copyrightability 
standard, this article proposes the enlargement of Title 17’s sui generis design 





Courts have twisted themselves into knots trying to create a test to effectively 
ascertain whether the artistic aspects of a useful article can be identified 
separately from and exist independently of the article's utilitarian function. 
 
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
194 L. Ed. 2d 829 (2016), quoting, Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 
1041 n.2  (9th Cir. 2014), quoting,  Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 




 United States copyright law explicitly enumerates “pictorial, graphic or sculptural works” 
[henceforth “PGS works”] among the subject matter of copyright.
1
  These include “works of 
artistic craftsmanship,” but copyright covers the design of a useful article “only if, and only to 
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.”
2
  Inseparable design features, whatever their aesthetic appeal, are not protected under 
copyright law; any coverage available to the designers must come from other regimes, 
particularly federal utility or design patent law.
3
  The “separability” test, as we will see, has 
resisted coherent application, but one thing is clear: in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress 
intended to impose a high threshold to copyrightability of useful articles.  Copyright, which 
“subsists” in a work of authorship upon creation and lasts for 70 years post mortem auctoris (or 
95 years following first publication),
4
 was not the appropriate regime for most industrial designs. 
Whatever “separability” means, it excludes more designs than would a test that merely inquires 
whether there exist other designs for the same kind of useful article.  The “separability” threshold 
therefore will in most cases set a higher bar than the idea/expression “merger” doctrine.  The 
latter inquires whether the “idea” is susceptible to multiple forms of expression, or whether 
instead plaintiff’s work represents the only way, or one of only a few ways, of presenting the 
idea.  By contrast, that the overall shape of a table or chair may be expressed through multiple 
                                                          
1
 17 U.S.C. sec. 102(a)(5). 
2
 17 U.S.C. sec. 101. 
3
 For a cross-IP discipline view that encompasses design protection, see Peter Lee and Madhavi Sunder, The Law of 
Look and Feel, UC DAVIS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (February 2016), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733780.  For designs that acquire secondary meaning, 
trademark law may afford more useful recourse than copyright or design patent law.  See, e.g., Dan Hunter and 
Suzannah Wood, The Laws of Design in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, forthcoming ADELAIDE L. REV. 
(2016). 
4
 At the time of passage of the 1976 Act, the terms were 50 years pma, or 75 years after first publication. 
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 This Article will first review the statutory definitions of a “pictorial, graphic or sculptural 
work,” and then will address the genesis of the troublesome “separability” requirement.  Next, 
the Article will analyze the attempts of administrative and judicial authorities to articulate a 
predictable test that remains faithful to the text and legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act.  
This discussion will include images of the works at issue in order to help the reader understand 
the courts’ analyses and outcomes (though in some instances, viewing the works may leave the 
reader more perplexed than ever).  Finally, this Article will offer two conclusions and a 
legislative proposal.  First, the controversy before the Court does not concern the “design of a 
useful article," and therefore does not require the Court to resolve the meaning of “separability.”  
Second, the statutory requirements of separate identifiability and independent existence apply to 
“features” of the design, not to the entire shape of a useful article; attempts (including those 
ventured by this article) to extend separability analysis to the useful article’s form as a whole 
prove unworkable.  Accordingly, rather than continuing to struggle with an intractable statutory 
copyrightability standard, this article proposes the enlargement of Title 17’s sui generis design 




 The U.S. Copyright Act distinguishes “useful articles” from works whose function is 
“merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”
6
  The latter are PGS 
works (or, in the case of works whose function is to convey information, other kinds of works of 
authorship, such as literary works) in themselves, and there is no need to undertake an inquiry 
into the “separability” of aesthetic and useful elements, because the utility at issue, such as a 
religious painting’s stimulation of spiritual contemplation,
7
 is not the kind of usefulness that the 
statute reserves to the patent system (or to the public domain).  Similarly, the depiction of a 
useful article, such as a model airplane or a drawing of a bottle, is not itself a useful article.  The 
statute, however, makes clear that a protected representation of a useful article gives the author 
no rights in the article depicted.
8
  A blueprint for constructing a car is not a “useful article” 
because its functions are to portray the appearance of the car, and to convey information about 
how to build it.  The car, once built, however, is a useful article; any copyright would be limited 
to elements, such as a hood ornament, that are separable from the car’s utilitarian aspects. 
 
                                                          
5
 See Jane C. Ginsburg & Robert A. Gorman, Copyright: Concepts and Insights 50 (Foundation Press 2012). 
6
 17 U.S.C. sec. 101, defining “useful article” as “ an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely 
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 
7
 See, e.g., Masquerade Novelty v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990): 
When hung on a wall, a painting may evoke a myriad of human emotions, but we would not say 
that the painting is not copyrightable because its artistic elements could not be separated from the 
emotional effect its creator hoped it would have on persons viewing it. The utilitarian nature of an 
animal nose mask or a painting of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ inheres solely in its appearance, 
regardless of the fact that the nose mask’s appearance is intended to evoke mirth and the painting’s 
appearance a feeling of religious reverence.  
8
 17 U.S.C. sec. 113(b).  See discussion infra [TAN]. 
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 The statute also specifies that the author of a PGS work has the exclusive right to 
reproduce it “in or on any kind of article, whether useful of otherwise.”
9
  For example, an artist 
holds the exclusive right to reproduce her drawing onto a t-shirt, a tablecloth, a shower curtain, 
etc.; a sculptor can authorize or prohibit the incorporation of his work into a paperweight or to 
ornament fireplace andirons. In the case of three-dimensional works, however, it becomes 
necessary to distinguish between incorporating the sculptural work “in or on” a useful article, 
and altering the form of the work in order to adapt it into a useful article; in the latter instance the 
copyright in the original sculpture subsists as a PGS work, but the adapted version becomes a 
useful article, and its characterization as a PGS work in its own right will depend on whether its 
form, or parts of its form, are “separable” from the article’s function.  For example, imagine a 
sculpture of a crocodile, with moving jaws.  The sculptor’s copyright extends to inserting salad 
tongs into the jaws; in that event, the sculpture is reproduced “on” a useful article, and its legal 
status as a PGS work remains unchanged.  But if the article consists of salad tongs shaped to 
resemble a crocodile’s toothy maw, then it is a useful article whose status as a PGS work turns 
on the separability test.  In the first crocodile example, the sculpture pre-exists its encounter with 
a useful article; in the second, the three-dimensional form is contemporaneously a useful article.  
This birth order distinction may yield arbitrary outcomes, among them the apparent privileging 
of shapes that are sub-optimally functional (the first set of crocodile salad tongs may not seize 
salad as well as the second), but, as we shall see, that is the result of a legislative policy choice to 
exclude functional items from the copyright domain, thus confining them to the realm of patents, 
or, more often, to the public domain.
10
      
 
 If the article at issue has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information,” then the statute directs that copyright 
extends only to those elements (if any) of the object’s design that are separable from its function: 
 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include . . . works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the 
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 




For our crocodile-shaped salad tongs to be protectable in whole or in part as a PGS work, it 
would be necessary to determine which if any design elements are separable from the function of 
                                                          
9
 Id. Sec. 113(a).  The examples that follow all illustrate reproduction of the PGS work “on” a useful article.  It is 
less clear what it means to reproduce the work “in” a useful article. (Thanks for Paul Goldstein for this observation.) 
The House Report refers to PGS works “employed as the design of a useful article,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94
th
 
Cong. 2d Sess. at 105 (1976) (emphasis supplied), which suggests that the rights in the preexisting PGS work extend 
to authorizing or prohibiting the incorporation of the design not only as a discrete decorative element, such as the 
hood ornament of a car, but also as the entire shape of the useful article, for example a sculpture hollowed out to 
serve as a vase.  As will be discussed further, infra, the copyright inheres in the PGS work, not in the useful article 
“in or on” which it is reproduced. 
10
 For detailed discussion of that policy choice, see Viva Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICHMOND 
L. REV. 611, 638-39 (2014) (the intention to confine functional features of useful articles to the patent realm is 
implicit in the statute and the legislative history). 
But see discussion infra [TAN] (attempt to overcome birth order distinction). 
11
 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 (defining pictorial, graphic and sculptural works). 
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seizing and serving salad.  Perhaps a shaft shaped to resemble the reptile’s scaly tail and body 
would qualify, but the snapping toothsome jaws perform the function of tongs.  Do they 
nonetheless incorporate “separable” features, so that the entire shape of the tongs would qualify 
for copyright protection?  As the chorus of judicial laments quoted at the outset of this Article 
reveals, courts have failed to interpret the meaning of the statutory separability standard in any 
consistent or coherent manner.  Before turning to the divergent and often contradictory judicial 
attempts, we should first detail the genesis of the statutory rule. 
 
 Genesis of the separability rule 
 
The 1909 Copyright Act listed “works of art” within the categories of registrable subject 
matter, and further included “models or designs for works of art.”
12
  Copyright Office regulations 
promulgated in 1910 clarified that the statute did not cover industrial designs. According to the 
Office:  
 
“Works of art.—This term includes all works belonging to the so-called fine arts. 
(Paintings, drawings, and sculpture). Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in 





While the regulation might seem to preclude protection for useful articles under copyright law, 
the Copyright Office nonetheless registered “clocks, candlesticks, inkstands, door knockers, 




By the late 1940s, the Copyright Office recognized the need to update its regulations 
more specifically to address the availability of protection for industrial design. Its revised 
regulations no longer interpolated “fine” before “work of art,” and explicitly provided protection 
for useful articles “includ[ing] works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspect are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and 
tapestries, as well as all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and 
sculpture.”
15
 While this regulation did not explicitly impose a separability requirement, the 





These regulations figured significantly in the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Mazer v. 
Stein, which concerned statuettes of dancers. The “statuettes were sold in quantity throughout the 
                                                          
12
 Act of March 4, 1909, 60
th
 Cong., 2d Sess., 35 Stat. 1075, sec. 5(g). 
13
 Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 15, 8 (1910).    
14
 Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 339, 342-43 (1990) [hereafter Perlmutter].  See generally The Meaning of 





 Session, Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights Pursuant to S. Res. 53, Studies 1-4, 63 (Comm. Print 1960) for an in-depth 
analysis of the evolution of the definition of “works of art” and the meaning of “writings” under the 
statutes and caselaw of the United States.  
15





country both as lamp bases and as statuettes . . . [but] [t]he sales in lamp form accounted for all 
but an insignificant portion of . . . sales.”
17
   (See images below.)
18
 
   
 
The Court embarked on a review of the relevant statutes, legislative history, and 
Copyright Office practices, noting the evolution of protection from “works of the fine arts” in 
1870 to “all the writings of an author” in 1909, to limiting protection to the “form but not . . . 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects” of a work of artistic craftsmanship in 1949.
19
  As a first step in 
its analysis, the Court considered whether the statuettes, as sculptures, were copyrightable.  
Given the gradual expansion of copyright to cover artistic works in general, the Court declined to 
find the statuettes too lacking in artistic merit to warrant protection.  The Court noted that 
“[i]individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid 
concept of art . . . Such expression, whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image 




The Mazer Court next rejected the proposition that “congressional enactment of the 
design patent laws should be interpreted as denying protection to artistic articles embodied or 
                                                          
17
 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 203 (1954). 
18
 Photograph of Dancer Statuette (on left), 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/336010822169623658/?from_navigate=true (image located on website, but no 
additional source information available); Photograph of Lamp Advertisement (on right),   
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/09/thats-where-light-is.html (image located on website, but no additional source 
information available). 
19
 Id. at 211-212. 
20
 Id. at 214. 
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reproduced in manufactured articles.”
21
  Emphasizing the differences in the nature and scope of 
copyright law and patent law, the Court ruled that the patent law did not preempt copyright 
protection for artistic works incorporated in useful articles: “the patentability of the statuettes, 
fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.”
22
  The Court noted that the 
“dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and 
the invention of original and ornamental design for design patents.”
23
  Hence, a design might be 
both a work of art for purposes of copyright and, if sufficiently novel, an ornamental design for 
purposes of design patents.  But, the court stressed, citing the Copyright Office regulation, 




Thus, whether the dancer began as a freestanding sculpture subsequently incorporated 
into a lamp base, or instead was created to serve as a lamp base, the work remained a sculpture, 
and on that ground was copyrightable as a work of art (assuming sufficient originality).
25
  As the 
author of a leading study on copyright protection of PGS works observed: “Mazer . . . 
established the principle that a work that is otherwise copyrightable does not lose protection 
when it is incorporated as part of a useful article . . . it did not, however, address the more 
difficult question of how to determine when elements of a useful article may constitute a 
copyrightable work of art.” 
26
   
 
It is that “more difficult question” that the separability rule, as it emerged from later 
Copyright Office regulations, was supposed to resolve.  Three years after Mazer, the Office’s 
first attempt read: 
 
When the shape of an article is dictated by, or is necessarily responsive to, the 
requirements of its utilitarian function, its shape, though unique and attractive, cannot 
qualify it as a work of art. If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact 
that it is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, 





In 1960, the Copyright Office introduced the separability test, updating the regulation to read: 
 
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that that article is unique 
and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a 
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial 
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing 
independently as a work of art such features will be eligible for registration. 
28
 
                                                          
21
 Id. at 215. 
22
 Id. at 217. 
23




 See id. at 218-19: “Nor do we think the subsequent registration of a work of art published as an element in a 
manufactured article, is a misuse of the copyright. This is not different from the registration of a statuette and its 
later embodiment in an industrial article.” 
26
 Perlmutter at 345. 
27
 37 C.F.R. §202.100(c) (1957). 
28




The amended regulation failed to produce clarity. It provided no guidance on how to determine 
the “sole intrinsic function” of an item, nor did it explain how separability was to be judged. 
“Did the artistic features have to be physically separable? In what sense did they have to be 




 Perhaps as a result of this lack of guidance, few judicial decisions post-Mazer contained 
any meaningful discussion of the separability standard. When courts denied protection, they 
tended to “rely on a failure to meet the requirement of original authorship rather than” the 
separability standard, and when they extended protection, courts tended either simply to state 
their conclusion that the work was copyrightable, or to “carve out distinct categories of works as 





 In a study produced in anticipation of what would become the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
Copyright Office revisited the problem of applied art, and proposed a new form of protection for 
useful articles: 
 
In the years since the Mazer decision, full protection under the copyright law has not 
proved inappropriate for “works of art” used as a design or decoration of useful articles. 
We do not believe, however, that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to 
industrial designs as such. In this area there is a delicate balance between the need for 
protection on the part of those who originate and invest in a design, and the possible 
effect of protection, if overextended, in restraining competition. The term of copyright . . 
. is too long for ordinary design protection. And there are other fundamentals of the 
copyright statute--the provisions on notice, deposit, registration, publication, and liability 
of innocent distributors of infringing articles, for example – that are not suitable for the 




While recognizing that a work of art could serve to decorate a useful article, the Copyright 
Office disfavored copyright protection for industrial design in general, largely out of concern for 
anticompetitive consequences.
32
  It preferred a mid-measure between a copyright protection 
limited to preexisting works of art incorporated in useful articles (such as the Mazer statuette) 
and full-on copyright protection for the whole domain of industrial design.  The Copyright 
Office therefore recommended protection for the artistic design of a useful article, but for a 
                                                          
29
 Perlmutter at 346. 
30
 Perlmutter at 346-47, citing, among other cases, L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) for 
failure to meet original authorship, Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5
th
 Cir. 1970) for 
finding copyrightability without additional explanation, and a pre-Mazer decision involving the same plaintiff and 
similar statuette-lamp bases, Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633 (9
th
 Cir. 1953) for relying on categories of works 
traditionally considered copyrightable works of fine art. 
31





15 (Comm. Print 1961). 
32
 Id. at 13: “We do not believe that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to industrial designs as such.  
In this area there is a delicate balance between the need for protection on the part of those who originate and invest 
in a design, and the possible effect of protection, if overextended, in restraining competition.” 
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shorter term, and with more restrictive formalities.  But only Congress could establish such a sui 
generis regime for applied art.   
 
 The Senate proposed such a system. Title II of the copyright reform bill would have 
given specific protection to “ornamental designs of useful articles.”
33
 The Title defined a useful 
article as “an article which in normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”
34
 The design was defined to 
“consist[] of those aspects or elements of the article, including its two-dimensional or three-
dimensional features of shape and surface, which make up the appearance of the article,”
35
, and 
was deemed to be ornamental if “it is intended to make the article attractive or distinct in 
appearance.”
36
 Protection would attach only if the work were original, not commonplace or a 
minor variation of a preexisting design, not “dictated solely by a utilization function of the article 
that embodies it,” and not apparel.
37
  Protection would last for an initial term of five years, with 
the possibility of an additional five years upon application.
38
 The Act would create a unique 
marking symbol – “(D)” – to cover such designs.
39
  “Protection . . . [would] be lost if application 
for registration of the design is not made within six months after the date on which the design 
was first made public.”
40
 The Senate proposal, in short, contained what was effectively a sui 
generis regime to cover only the artistic design elements of a useful article. 
 
 When the Senate proposal reached the House of Representatives, however, the House 
Judiciary Committee “deleted Title II of the bill entirely.”
41
  The Judiciary Committee explained 
that it chose to remove the section “in part because the new form of design protection provided 
by Title II could not truly be considered copyright protection and therefore appropriately within 
the scope of copyright revision.”
42
  According to the House Report, the Senate proposal failed to 
address two key questions: “first, what agency should administer this new design protection 
system and, second, should typeface designs be given the protections of the title?”
43
  In addition, 
the Judiciary Committee gave weight to the Justice Department’s objection that “Title II would 
create a new monopoly which has not been justified by a showing that its benefits will outweigh 
the disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use.”
44
  For the Justice Department, 
the Senate’s amendment would have protected subject matter that was in fact in the public 
domain; creation of a new monopoly right in unpatented industrial design therefore required a 
heavy burden of justification, unmet in this instance. 
 
After eliminating Title II, the House Judiciary Committee chose to “revise[] the 
definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ in section 101 to clarify the distinction 
                                                          
33
 S. Rep. 94-473, Title II. 
34
 Id. at §201(b)(1). 
35
 Id. at  §201(b)(2). 
36
 Id. at §201(b)(3). 
37
 Id. at §202. 
38
 Id. at §205. 
39
 Id. at §206(a). 
40
 Id. at §209(a). 
41
 H.R. Conf. Rep. 94-1733 at 82. 
42







between works of applied art subject to protection under the bill and industrial designs not 
subject to copyright protection.”
45
 The final bill drafted its definitions of pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works as well as of useful articles “[i]n accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Mazer,”
46
 thus yielding the current section 101 definition with its requirement that the design 
features of useful article be separately identifiable and capable of existing independently of the 
article’s utilitarian aspects.  The final bill’s definition of “useful article” tracked the 1960 
Copyright Office regulation, with one important change: while the regulation identified an article 
whose “sole intrinsic function . . . is its utility” (emphasis supplied) section 101 defines a “useful 
article [as] an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information. . . .” (emphasis supplied).  As a result, even a 
highly decorative item with a single utilitarian function met the definition of a useful article. 
Broadening the language in this fashion had the effect of narrowing the kinds of works of applied 
art which would be deemed protectable “pictorial, graphic or sculptural works,” because more 
works would be required to meet the separability standard.  
 
The House Judiciary Committee explained its reasoning: 
 
In adopting this amendatory language, the Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as 
possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of 
industrial design. A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable 
of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as 
textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like. The same is true when a statue or 
carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated 
into a product without losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art. On the 
other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying 
and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the 
bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television 
set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or 
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the 
design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test of separability and independence 
from ‘the utilitarian aspects of the article’ does not depend upon the nature of the design-- 
that is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to 
functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from 
the useful article as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three-dimensional design 
contains some such element (for example, a carving on the back of a chair or a floral 
relief design on silver flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that element, 




Thus, the House Judiciary Committee “stressed Congress’s desire to exclude from protection the 
general class of industrial products, notwithstanding any ‘aesthetically satisfying’ design.”
48
   
 
                                                          
45
 H.R. Conf. Rep. 94-1733 at 82. 
46
 H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 54. 
47
 Id. at 55. 
48
 Perlmutter at 351. 
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At the same time, however, the House Report appeared to introduce some flexibility into 
the standard by inserting a term not found in the statute.  While the statute covers “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article,” the House Report would extend protection 
to an “element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian 
aspects of that article” (emphasis supplied).
49
 A test of physical separability seems fairly easy to 
apply, Mazer offering a paradigmatic example: removing the lampshade, light bulb, dowel and 
electric cord leaves the freestanding statuette.  “Conceptual” separability, however, has proved 
far more elusive.  Does it mean that one could imagine the design as a separate work of art were 
it extracted from its utilitarian surroundings, as would be the case for the “carving on the back of 
a chair or a floral relief design on silver flatware” cited in the House Report, without needing 
physically to take an axe to the chair to detach the carving?  In the cited examples, the design 
element appears to be engrafted onto the shape of the useful article without necessarily altering 
the shape itself.  It is not too difficult to “conceive of” the design being lifted off the useful 
article, leaving the article otherwise intact.  Indeed, this concept of conceptual separability seems 
the flip side of the artist’s section 113(a) right to reproduce a PGS work “in or on” a useful 
article. In the latter instance, a pre-existing protectable design is affixed to a pre-existing useful 
article; in the former, the imagined separation of the design and the useful article yields two 
stand-alone items, one of which will be a protectable PGS work.  As we will see in the next 
section, the Copyright Office adheres to this approach to “conceptual” separability.  We will 





The U.S. Copyright Office administers the registration of works of authorship.  
Registration is not a prerequisite to protection, but no suit may be brought for infringement of a 
work of US origin unless the work has been registered before the suit is filed.
50
  Thus any 
rightholder of a U.S. work of applied art who seeks to enforce her copyright through an 
infringement action must convince the Copyright Office examiners that the claimed design 
elements are separable from the utilitarian aspects in order to obtain the necessary certificate of 
registration.
51
  The Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices (Third Edition 2014) states: 
 
924.2(B) Conceptual Separability 
 
                                                          
49
 H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 55.  For a fuller discussion of the legislative history, as well as of the pre-1976 Act 
treatment of works of applied art, see, e.g., William Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, [section mark] 3:125-3:135 
(2016). 
50
 17 U.S.C. sec. 411(a). Or at least, the plaintiff has filed an application to register.  Compare Cosmetic Ideas v. 
IAC/Interactive Corp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“application approach”) with La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202–
04 (10th Cir. 2005); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(“registration approach”). 
51
 If the Register continues to refuse, the applicant may nonetheless file suit; the Register may choose to become a 
party to the action, 17 U.S.C. sec. 411(a). 
12 
 
The U.S. Copyright Office applies the conceptual separability test only if it determines 
that the useful article contains pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that cannot be 
physically separated from that article. 
 
Conceptual separability means that a feature of the useful article is clearly recognizable 
as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be 
physically separated from the article by ordinary means. This artistic feature must be 
capable of being visualized — either on paper or as a free-standing sculpture — as a 
work of authorship that is independent from the overall shape of the useful article. In 
other words, the feature must be imagined separately and independently from the useful 
article without destroying the basic shape of that article. A pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
feature satisfies this requirement only if the artistic feature and the useful article could 
both exist side by side and be perceived as fully realized, separate works — one an 
artistic work and the other a useful article. For example, the carving on the back of a 
chair or an engraving on a vase would be considered conceptually separable, because one 
could imagine the carving or the engraving as a drawing on a piece of paper that is 
entirely distinct from the overall shape of the chair and the vase. Even if the carving or 
the engraving was removed the shape of the chair and the vase would remain unchanged, 
and both the chair and the vase would still be capable of serving a useful purpose. H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668-69. 
 
Under the Copyright Office’s approach, in the case of an artistically-designed useful 
article, it is necessary to conceive of two distinct objects, one useful, the other artistic, “without 
destroying the basic shape of that article.”  This exercise of the imagination lends itself to the 
kinds of decorative elements envisaged in the House Report: one can imagine a drawing or 
carving on the back of a chair having an existence independent from the chair, without affecting 
the functioning of the chair as an item of furniture.  In effect, this conceptual effort recalls the 
author’s right to reproduce a pre-existing PGS work “in or on” a useful article; one can imagine 
the drawing or carving as a free-standing work subsequently applied to the back of the chair.  By 
contrast, this kind of conceptual exercise does not adapt well to the entire shape of the useful 
article, because it is difficult to imagine how the entire shape of an object can exist 
independently of the object itself.  The Copyright Office’s analysis appears to presume that, in 
imagining a “side by side” coexistence of the useful and the decorative elements, the imagined 
detachment of the decorative aspect will leave the rest of the object intact and functioning.  But if 
the aesthetic element constitutes the entire form of the object, there is no “rest of” the object to 
persist independently.
52
   
 
The Compendium continues with examples of “conceptually separable” elements; none 
involve the total shape of a useful article.  Rather, the Compendium casts doubt on the latter’s 
registrability.    
 
• Artwork printed on a t-shirt, beach towel, or carpet. 
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 See, e.g., US Copyright Office Review Board, Re:  Ql, QlO, Ql.S Correspondence ID:  1-JT7IVR (11 September 
2014) p. 5 (discussed infra): (“If one were to conceptually separate the features of [the works identified in the 
application], there would be no underlying works remaining.  The Works, therefore, fail the Copyright Office's test 




• A colorful pattern decorating the surface of a shopping bag. 
 
• A drawing on the surface of wallpaper. 
 
• A floral relief decorating the handle of a spoon. 
 
Merely analogizing the general shape of a useful article to a work of modern sculpture or 
an abstract sculpture does not satisfy the conceptual separability test, because it does not 
provide an objective basis for visualizing the artistic features and the useful article as 
separate and independent works. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (1978) 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (agreeing with the Office’s determination that “the overall design or 
configuration of a utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as 
functional considerations, is not eligible for copyright”). 
 
The Compendium’s examples feature artworks effectively “applied to” useful articles,
53
 
an approach consistent with what I have called the “flip side” of the section 113(a) right to 
reproduce a PGS work “in or on” a useful article.  Had the “artwork printed on a t-shirt, beach 
towel, or carpet” pre-existed the useful article to which the “artwork” was affixed, the statute 
establishes that the “artwork” author’s copyright would extend to its being printed on those 
articles; reproduction of the article bearing the artwork would infringe the author’s copyright.  If 
the “artwork” was created to be “printed on a t-shirt, beach towel, or carpet” but is nonetheless a 
separately identifiable PGS work, then it is copyrightable notwithstanding its incorporation in a 
useful article.  The Copyright Office’s treatment of conceptual separability thus eliminates 
differential outcomes based on the birth order of the design relative to the useful article – so long 
as the design pertains to a discreet aspect of that article. 
 
By contrast, the Copyright Office appears to reject more strenuous efforts of 
conceptualization which might imagine the entire shape of a useful article to be “separable” if 
the shape in no way affected its function.  This approach, however, risks sliding into an 
idea/expression test, which would deem protectable any design that was not necessary to the 
functioning of the article.  The Compendium rejects that test explicitly with respect to individual 
features, and necessarily implicitly with respect the overall design of the article:   
 
The fact that a useful article could have been designed differently or the fact that an 
artistic feature is not necessary to or dictated by the utilitarian aspects of that article is 
irrelevant to this analysis. If the feature is an integral part of the overall shape or contour 
of the useful article, that feature cannot be considered conceptually separable because 
removing it would destroy the basic shape of the useful article. See generally H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668-69. 
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 Cf. Paolo Marzano, An Ill-Designed Protection for a Well-Designed Product: Italy and its Copyright Protection of 
Industrial Design, 240 RIDA 119 (April 2014) (suggesting - regarding Italian copyright law, which formerly 
imposed a separabilty test - that “applied art” should not mean industrial design in general, but rather artworks (e,g,, 
drawings, paintings, sculpture) applied to a useful article).  Italy, law of 21 April 1941, n.633, art.2, since amended 
by Legislative Decree 2 February 2001, n.95, implementing EU Directive 98/71/EC. 
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The Copyright Office Compendium also details what considerations do not count in assessing 
the conceptual separability of a design: 
 
924.2(C) Factors Not Relevant in Evaluating Separability 
 
In assessing whether certain elements are physically or conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian functions of a useful article, registration specialists do not consider the 
following: (i) the aesthetic value of the design; (ii) the fact that the article could have 
been designed differently; or (iii) the amount of effort or expense that went into the 
making of the design. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668-69. 
  
Specific applications of the Copyright Office rules can be found in the correspondence of 
the Review Board of the United States Copyright Office with applicants whose works the Office 
has declined to register.
54
  A pattern emerges from these letters.  First, the Review Board 
ascertains if the design of the useful article presents separable elements.  Second, the Review 
Board examines those elements for minimal originality.  Between 1995-2014 the Review Board 
resolved 396 appeals, of which 146 concerned useful articles. Three appeals resulted in 






 below illustrates the grounds for denying the remaining 143 appeals. Of these 
63 were denied registration because the Board found the design features physically or 
conceptually inseparable from their utilitarian function.  Another 80 were rejected on other 
grounds: 79 because the design features, even if separable, lacked minimal originality, and 1 for 






                                                          
54
 The University of New Hampshire maintains a database of Decision of the Appeals Board - U.S. Copyright Office 
1995-2014, http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/copyrightappeals.asp .  The statements in text are based on a search 
of that database for rejections of form VA (visual art) applications from 1995-2014. 
55
 In two of those cases, the Board reversed its prior decision and granted copyright on grounds of originality. The 
other accepted appeal – after a previous finding of a lack of separability – was registered under the Rule of Doubt 
due to an inability of the Board to determine if the work was a model of a useful article or a useful article itself.   
56











































































































Where the registrant has sought to claim the entire form of the article as a PGS work, the 
Review Board has declined to find separability.  For example, where the applicant sought to 
register the overall shape of “crash dummy” human forms designed for testing the impact of 
automobile crashes on the human body (pictured below)
57





[Y]ou argue that the Works' overall visual aesthetic appearances are conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian functions of a crash test dummy.  We find your arguments 
to be unpersuasive. Specifically, we find it impossible to imagine a way to conceptually 
separate the aesthetic design elements from the Works without destroying their shape and 
configuration as human-based testing devices.  In order for Ql, QJO, and QJ.5 to be 
useful as crash test dummies, designed to measure the forces imposed on the human body 
during an impact, the Works necessarily need to be designed in the basic image of a 
human.  It is well settled that copyright protection is not available based on the "overall 
shape or configuration" of a utilitarian article "no matter how aesthetically pleasing that 
shape or configuration might be."  To argue that the Works' aesthetic appearances are 
separable from the useful articles underneath is to claim that the Works' overall shapes 
and forms are distinguishable from their intended function. We do not agree. 
 
. . . The sculptural aspects of the Works cannot be envisioned separately without 
completely destroying their images or configurations.  If one were to conceptually 
separate the features of Ql, Ql0, and QJ.5, there would be no underlying works 




                                                          
57
 Re Ql, QlO, Ql. Correspondence ID:  1-JT7IVR (Sept. 11, 2014), p. 2 (image located in appeal, but no additional 
source information available). 
58
 Id. at p. 5 (citation omitted). 
Where a useful article does manifest separable design elements, it does not automatically follow that those elements 
will constitute a protectable PGS work.  The Copyright Office’s second basis for refusal to register the design of 
portions of a useful article is lack of originality.  If the Copyright Office finds that the form, separated from the 
remainder of the article, is banal, it will refuse registration for lack of copyrightable authorship, as Re Ornamented 
16 
 
By excluding the “overall shape or configuration” of a useful article, the Copyright 
Office’s application of the separability test effectively assesses only those elements that one may 
imagine physically detaching from the article.  That said, the Office’s imagined physical 
detachment of individual, original, design elements could still encompass elements whose 
removal would affect the article’s appearance, so long as it did not alter the article’s utility.  
While the Copyright Office imagines removal of the design items “without destroying the basic 
shape of that article,”
59
 the term “basic shape” leaves room for maneuver.  For example, where a 
design’s shape is superfluous to the article’s function, as would be the case were the back of the 
chair to follow the contours of elaborately shaped woodwork that did not impact the seating 
experience (that is, the woodwork played no structural or ergonomic role), then even though the 
overall shape of the chair would look different were its design elements lifted off, its “basic 
shape” – the unadorned chair back – would remain intact.
60
  The superfluous design elements 
therefore would be “conceptually separable.”   
 
But perhaps efforts more arduous than those the Copyright Office currently expends to 
conceptualize the design elements independently from their utility could identify additional 
protectable elements, whether individually or as a whole.  One widely adopted approach 
considers the extent to which an article’s function affects the designer’s aesthetic choices, an 
approach that would endeavor to locate copyrightability on a sliding scale from form-follows-
function (inseparable) to functionally gratuitous (separable).
61
  As we shall see the next section, 
judicial authorities have also offered many more, tests for determining conceptual separability.  
The plethora of standards has, not surprisingly, produced considerable confusion and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Vanity (Infinity Kitchen Cabinet) Ornamented Coffee Table (Atelier Display Cabinet) Ornamented Cabinet 
(Guinevere 8' Breakfront Cabinet) Correspondence ID: 1-FJGCFS (10 February, 2014), p. 3 (image located in 




 Compendium sec. 924.2(B) (2014). 
60
 See, e.g., Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010), discussed 
and pictured infra. 
61
 See, e.g. Universal Furniture, supra; Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(prom dresses); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) and Pivot 
Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004), discussed and pictured infra.   
17 
 
unpredictability, culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in the 







 As an initial matter, recall that “conceptual separability” is not a statutory standard; it 
emerges from the legislative history. Textualists therefore might urge curtailing further 
elaboration of conceptual separability, and henceforth confining the inquiry to “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that [1] can be identified separately from, and [2] are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”
63
  “Features” suggests aspects or 
components of the design, not the entirety of the form of the useful article.  The statutory text 
best fits physically separable pictorial, graphic or sculptural design elements, as exemplified by 
the Mazer statuette lamp base: these clearly can be “identified separately from” and “exist 
independently of” the useful article’s functional elements; indeed the lamp bases appear initially 
to have been freestanding statuettes.  But the text does not preclude elements whose physical 
removal one might imagine, even where actual removal would change the appearance of the 
useful article, such as chopping the carving off the back of the chair.  The Compendium’s 
examples, albeit offered as elaborations on “conceptual separability,” meet the dual statutory 
requirements of separate identifiability and independent existence, at least if one interprets the 
statutory phrase “capable of existing independently” to extend to the imaginary removal of the 
element as a predicate to its existing independently from the article.  In effect, this conceptual 
effort would imagine the design feature as a preexisting PGS work reproduced on or in the useful 
article.  Interpreting separability as the mirror image of section 113(a) would also be consonant 
with the statutory text: if notwithstanding its application to or incorporation in a useful article, 
the design element could have been a freestanding PGS work, then it is both separately 
identifiable, and capable of separate existence.
64
        
 
 In any event, almost every federal court of appeal that has adjudicated the 
copyrightability of design elements of useful articles has purported to apply a test of conceptual 
separability, though each court has formulated that test differently.
65
  Moreover, in some 
                                                          
62
 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015). 
63
 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 (emphasis supplied). 
64
 By contrast, applying the mirror image approach to the entire form of a useful article is more problematic, for, as 
suggested above, “features” uneasily encompasses the whole rather than particular parts of the useful article.  Albeit 
were the complete abstraction of the article’s form from its function possible, because the shape is completely 
unnecessary to the article’s function, and the shape could stand on its own as a work of art, perhaps the overall shape 
might be a “feature.”  See Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright, sec. 2.5.3(b) (3d ed. 2005) (applying a “stand 
alone” test to construe “conceptual separability” generally, and citing example of a slipper in the shape of a bear 
paw). 
65
 Compare Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (“if design 
elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to 
be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as 
reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual separability 
exists.”), with Varsity Brands v Star Athletica, 799 F.3d 468, 488  (6
th
 Cir. 2015) (“What are the utilitarian aspects 
of the useful article? . . . Can the viewer of the design identify pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features separately 
from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article? . . . Can the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the design of 
the useful article exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article?”), with Pivot Point Int’l v. 
18 
 
instances, courts embarked on their tortuous forays into separability tests without adequately 
analyzing first whether the disputed design was in fact a design of a “useful article.”  
Separability becomes an issue only if the asserted PGS work is “a design of a useful article.”
66
  
As we will see, courts might better have treated some cases, including Varsity Brands, as 
involving PGS elements applied to useful articles, rather than as useful articles in themselves. 
 
The whole versus the parts: constituent elements 
 
Because “a useful article, as a whole, does not receive copyright protection, but any 
constituent design elements that can be physically or conceptually separated from the underlying 
article can receive copyright protection,”
67
 the majority of judicial decisions finding “conceptual 
separability”
68
 focus on the “constituent items” – decorative elements detached from the overall 
shape of the article.  For example, in Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, 
Inc., a case involving highly ornate furniture design (pictured below)
69
, the Fourth Circuit echoed 
the Copyright Office’s rejection of the overall design of a useful article.
70
 Nonetheless, the court 
held particular decorative aspects of the furniture protectable on the ground that they were 
“superfluous nonfunctional adornments for which the shape of the furniture (which is not 
copyrightable) serves as the vehicle.”
71
  The court found the designs’ ornamental profusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004) (independence of design decisions from utilitarian functions), 
with Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (conceptual separability requires the claimed 
design feature “can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally conceived, and . . . the useful article in which it is 
embodied would be equally useful without it”), with Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 549 
Fed.Appx. 913, 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (conceptual separability concerns “ornamental, superfluous designs contained 
within useful objects;” “[c]onceptual separability does not apply to ‘functional components of useful articles, no 
matter how artistically designed . . . unless they are physically separable from the useful article.”) 
66
 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 (definition of a PGS work). 
67
 Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 549 Fed.Appx. 913, 921 (11th Cir. 2013) (lighting 
fixture), quoting Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010) (pacifier holder). 
68
 The burden of proving separability falls on the plaintiff; many cases have been dismissed at the outset for failure 
to plead with particularity which elements of the article were conceptually separable and why.  See, e.g., Gusler v. 
Fischer, 580 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“electric vacuum device to extract fluid from the nose of an infant”), 
In re Chicago Newspaper Liquidation Corp., 490 B.R. 487 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (front-backpack); Spectrum 
Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Intern., LLC, 2008 WL 416264 (W.D.Tx. 2008) (lighting fixture); Ochre LLC v. 
Rockwell Architecture Planning and Design, P.C., 2012 WL 6082387 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (chandelier designs); Design 
Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC, 2010 WL 5418893 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (furniture designs); and Heptagon Creations, 
Ltd. v. Core Group Marketing LLC, 2011 WL 6600267 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (furniture designs). 
69
 Photographs of Dining Room, Table, and Chair, UNIVERSAL EXHIBITS Civil Action No. 1:04CV00977 
(M.D.N.C. 2007), http://168.144.88.155/ce/ (image located on website, but no additional source information 
available). 
70
 618 F.3d 417, 433 (4th Cir. 2010):  
the industrial design of a unique, aesthetically pleasing chair cannot be separated from the chair’s utilitarian 
function, and therefore, is not subject to copyright protection.  . . .  the “shape of the furniture cannot be the 
subject of a copyright, no matter how aesthetically pleasing it may be,” but the “decorative elements that 
are separable from the furniture can be.” 
71
 Id at 434: 
The [furniture collection] designs are highly ornate collections of furniture adorned with three-dimensional 
shells, acanthus leaves, columns, finials, rosettes, and other carvings. Steven Russell [the creator of the 
collections] described the collections as “an ornamentation explosion,” and Universal’s expert Thomas 
Moser similarly described the [collections] as “essentially vehicles for expressing ornament.” These 
decorative compilations are not “industrial designs” of furniture. They are not like a bare human torso 
mannequin for which adornment is the very utilitarian purpose of the object. Like statuettes on a lamp base, 
19 
 
“three-dimensional shells, acanthus leaves, columns, finials, rosettes, and other carvings” 
“‘wholly unnecessary’ to the furniture’s utilitarian function.”    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the [collections’] design compilations are superfluous nonfunctional adornments for which the shape of the 
furniture (which is not copyrightable) serves as the vehicle. The designs can therefore be “identified 
separately from” the utilitarian aspects of the furniture.  17 U.S.C. § 101. Indeed, the designs are “wholly 
unnecessary” to the furniture’s utilitarian function.  A carved scroll of leaves on a nightstand post, for 










By contrast, an absence of ornamentation may condemn the design of a useful article, 
because the artistic creativity (if any) inheres in the overall form of the object, which, no matter 
how “aesthetically satisfying,”
72
 courts generally decline to protect.  For example, in Progressive 
Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.,
73
, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that conceptual 
                                                          
72
 H.R. Conf. Rep. 94-1733 at 82.  
73
 549 Fed.Appx. 913, 921 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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separability applies to “ornamental, superfluous designs contained within useful objects,” and 
not to the object as a whole, in that case, an unadorned chandelier (of the kind pictured below)
74




Some courts’ separation of protectable decorative detail from the useful article as a whole 
recalls section 113(a).  Indeed, in those decisions, the contested designs might more accurately 
have been analyzed as pre-existing pictorial works affixed onto useful articles.  For example, in 
Varsity Brands, the Sixth Circuit ruled that team insignia applied to cheerleader uniforms 
(pictured below)
75
 were separable and protectable from the overall design of the uniforms.  
While the court found separability because “the arrangement of stripes, chevrons, color blocks, 
and zigzags are ‘wholly unnecessary to the performance of’ the garment's ability to cover the 
body, permit free movement, and wick moisture,”
76
 it should instead have treated those elements 
as fabric design, a category long recognized as a pictorial or graphic work.
77
  Copyright does not 
                                                          
74
 Photograph of Chandelier, http://www.lowes.com/pd_423822-43501-FD12-
048_1z0y296Z1z0yymk__?productId=4764695&pl=1 (the above image is a “6-Light…chandelier[] sold under the 
‘Portfolio’ brand” at Lowe’s (549 Fed. Appx., 916)). 
75
 799 F.3d at 473 (image located in opinion, but no additional source information available). 
76
  Id. at 491. 
77
 See, e.g., L.A. Printex Industries v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs 
Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Eve of Milady v. Impression Bridal, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
By contrast, In Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint alleging that defendant competitor infringed the design of 
plaintiff’s prom dress.  According to the District Court, plaintiff “conceded that the individual elements of the dress 
(such as the pattern of sequins) were not copyrightable in isolation.  Jovani acknowledged that there is no discernible 
pattern of sequins . . . Jovani has conceded that it is not claiming a copyright in the fabric designs of its dress.” 
Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542, (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The sequin pattern’s lack of 
originality indicates that, unlike Varsity Brands, which involved “multiple graphic designs that appear on the 
23 
 
protect the garments into which the design-bearing fabric is cut, but neither does the fashioning 




Rather than addressing the cheerleading garments as a whole (and detailing ten different 
tests of conceptual separability), the court should have recognized that the design elements at 
issue – the fabric designs representing team insignia – were not useful articles in the first place.  
The facts the court discussed might have alerted it to the difference between the design elements 
(insignia) and the useful article (the garment).  Indeed, the court distinguished between the 
“graphic design” and the uniform: 
 
The five Varsity designs are examples of how a cheerleading uniform still looks like a 
cheerleading uniform no matter how different the arrangement of the stripes, chevrons, 
colorblocks, and zigzags appear on the surface of the uniform. All of Varsity’s graphic 
designs are interchangeable. Varsity’s customers choose among the designs in the catalog, 
including the five designs at issue, select one of the designs, and then customize the color 
scheme. The interchangeability of Varsity’s designs is evidence that customers can identify 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cheerleading uniforms and warm-ups they sell,” 799 F.3d at 470, Jovani could not have been reconceptualized as a 
fabric design case. 
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differences between the graphic features of each design, and thus a graphic design and a 





In highlighting the graphic designs’ “interchangeability,” the Sixth Circuit effectively applied the 
statutory standards of separate identifiability and independent existence of the designs relative to 
the uniforms.  But the court would have made shorter work of its analysis had it drawn a 
different conclusion from its characterization of “the stripes, chevrons, colorblocks, and zigzags” 
as the “graphic design,” and from the customers’ selection among the graphic designs: these 
elements are PGS works “reproduced on” the uniform (the useful article); the graphic designs’ 




Similarly, in Home Legend v. Mannington Mills,
80
 the useful article was floorboards made of 
compacted resin and sawdust, onto which the plaintiff had laminated paper painted to resemble 
“distressed” woodgrain so that the floorboards would convey the appearance of true wood planks 
(pictured below)
81
.  The court held the design separable.  One may easily envision lifting off the 
design (as indeed it had been pasted on), without affecting the flooring, other than aesthetically.  
That the ersatz wood grain made unsightly pressed sawdust floorboards more aesthetically 
desirable undoubtedly affected their commercial appeal, but “aesthetic functionality” is not a 
utilitarian function in the copyright sense.  The court should instead have recognized that the 
“work” allegedly infringed was the depiction of the wood grain, not the floorboards onto which 
the pictures had been glued.  Like Varsity Brands, Home Legend would have avoided inquiry 
into conceptual separability had it perceived the case as an instance of reproducing a PGS work 
on a useful article. 
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 799 F.3d at 491.  Toward the end of its opinion, the Sixth Circuit finally recognized “we believe that the graphic 
features of Varsity's cheerleading-uniform designs are more like fabric design than dress design,” id at 493. 
79
 The court acknowledged that “If the design is not the design of a useful article, then there is no need to inquire 
into whether there are “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the [useful] article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.”  But it then 
stated that the design at issue was the design of the uniform rather than “the graphic features of each design 
[uniform]” Id. at 487.  See also Patry, supra, at 3:143.50 (distinguishing between the design “of” a useful article, and 
a design applied “to” a useful article, and stating that Varsity Brands exemplifies the latter. 
80
 784 F.3d 1404 (11
th
 Cir. 2015). 
81
 Photograph of Flooring, http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2015/05/wood.png (image located on website, but no additional source information 
available). Home Legend sold the Distressed Maple Mendocino, on the left, while Mannington Mills sold the Glazed 





 Varsity Brands and Mannington Mills reveal the importance of ascertaining whether the 
contested design is in fact the design of a “useful article.”  A PGS work applied to (“reproduced 
on”) a useful article is not itself a useful article, and courts need not “twist themselves into 
knots” endeavoring to parse the meaning of the statutory separability standard.  Were the 
Supreme Court to decline to reach separability on the ground that resolution of the Varsity 
Brands dispute does not in fact require it, some might be disappointed that the Court would fail 
to tidy the disarray in the lower courts.  But the predicate issue – what is the design of a “useful 
article” – also warrants more attention than lower courts have given it.  Thus, were the Court to 
leave separability to a case that in fact poses that issue, the Court would still contribute to 
clarifying this area of copyright law. 
 
 
The whole versus the parts: overall form 
 
The cases in which “[c]ourts have struggled mightily to formulate a test to determine 
whether ‘the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features’ incorporated into the design of a useful 
article ‘can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the [useful] article’”
82
 most often address the design of a useful article as a 
whole.  In these instances, the overall form may manifest substantial artistic accomplishment 
(theoretically, a copyright-irrelevant consideration), prompting judicial inclination to find 
separability lest an aesthetically meritorious design fall prey to piracy.  In often divided 
decisions, some appellate courts have resisted the temptation, while others have strained to fit the 
overall form within the separability framework.  Hence the Gordian metaphor whose frequent 
reiteration
83
 has made it a trope in design copyright cases. 
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 Varsity Brands, supra, 799 F.3d at 484. 
83




As the Varsity Brands majority, in enumerating nine variants on the separability test and 
adding one of its own, evidences,
84
 the caselaw incessantly restates the separability test, in 
formulations sometimes adapting the “capable of existing separately” criterion of the statutory 
definition, and sometimes evaluating the relationship of design choices to utilitarian objectives 
(and sometimes both).  In the “separate existence” camp, one might range the conceptual 
superimposition of the design elements atop a basic utilitarian framework;
85
 the viewer’s 
response to the object as a work of art rather than as a useful article;
86
 and the irrelevance of the 
design to the article’s functional utility.
87
  In the design process camp fall inquiries into the 







 The Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl 
exemplifies both the “superimposition” and the “viewer response” approaches to conceptual 
separability.  In a dispute concerning artistically-designed belt buckles (pictured below)
89
, a 
majority of the Second Circuit panel succeeded in imagining the removal of the belt buckle 
covers from the utilitarian housing (even though the buckles apparently were fused into a single 
piece).  The majority considered public perception of the objects as purely ornamental as 
probative of the distinct conceptualization of the articles’ aesthetic features.  Because many 
purchasers of the belt buckles wore them not for the purpose of holding up trousers, but rather as 
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 Id. at 484-85. 
85
 See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.1980). 
86
 See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord, supra; Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
87
 See, e.g., Varsity Brands, supra at [PIN] (team insignia “wholly unnecessary” to the garments’ function).  
Evidence that purchasers in fact use the contested item for purely decorative rather than utilitarian purposes may 
help a court determine, well after the work’s initial publication, that the design elements are separable.  But that 
evidence may not be available at the time of publication, when many applications for registration are made, and the 
evidence thus will not assist the Copyright Office’s examination.  Thanks to Rob Kasunic for this observation. 
88
 See, e.g., Brandir [Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Pivot Point Int’l v. 
Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004). 
89
 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 995 (image located in opinion, but no additional source information available). 
90
 Kieselstein-Cord also exemplifies the “market value” variant of the “viewer response” approach: “conceptual 
separability exists where there is substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still be 
marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities,” Nimmer on 
Copyright, §2.08(B)(3) (2015); Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005). The 
Second Circuit also noted the belt buckles’ inclusion in museum collections; this feature may attest to the 
(copyright-irrelevant) aesthetic worthiness of the design, but unless the collection assembles works that are not 
useful articles, e.g., jewelry designs, the disputed design’s presence in a museum’s collection of applied art is not 





 By contrast, five years later in Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
91
 a majority 
of the Second Circuit, arguing essentially by assertion, rejected the relevance of public response 
to plaintiff’s polystyrene shirt-display forms (pictured below)
92
 as sculptures:  
 
Appellant emphasizes that clay sculpting, often used in traditional sculpture, was used in 
making the molds for the forms. It also stresses that the forms have been responded to as 
sculptural forms, and have been used for purposes other than modeling clothes, e.g., as 
decorating props and signs without any clothing or accessories. While this may indicate 
that the forms are "aesthetically satisfying and valuable," it is insufficient to show that the 
forms possess aesthetic or artistic features that are physically or conceptually separable 
from the forms' use as utilitarian objects to display clothes. On the contrary, to the extent 
the forms possess aesthetically pleasing features, even when these features are considered 
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 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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 Robert E. Bishop, Photographs of Carol Barnhart Shirt Display Forms (2016). 
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 In dissent, Judge Newman endeavored to give meaning to the notion of “conceptual” 
separability.  He contended that “the article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept 
that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.  . . .  [T]he requisite 
‘separateness’ exists whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two 
different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”
94
  This test will in fact 
exclude most artistically designed useful objects, because perceiving the object as both artistic 
and useful – Judge Newman gave the example of an artistically-designed chair – does not 
suffice.  The artistic aspects must displace identification of the object as useful.  The standard 
seems to invite philistinism: “I don’t know what it is, so it must be Art.”  As a result, Judge 
Newman’s conceptual displacement approach may serve more to identify when an object’s 
overall design is not separable, than when it is.  
 
 Finally, in the category I am calling “separate existence” conceptual separability, would 
fall designs of useful articles whose overall appearance does not affect their function.  We have 
seen that ornamentally superfluous elements can be conceptually detached from the form as a 
whole and therefore classed as PGS works.  But can functional irrelevance characterize the entire 
shape of a useful article?  A divided Seventh Circuit in Pivot Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., 
Inc.,
95
 concerning mannequin heads used for styling hair and applying makeup in beauty schools 
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 Id at 422. 
95





, stated, quoting Judge Newman, “[c]onceptual separability exists . . . when the 
artistic aspects of an article can be ‘conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian 
function.’”
97
 Shifting to the design-process approach to conceptual separability (analyzed in the 
next section), the majority continued, “This independence is necessarily informed by ‘whether 
the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences.’”
98
  We will address design-process analysis 
subsequently.  For present purposes, the court’s determination that the heads’ designer shaped 
the faces according to his artistic preferences, without regard for the use to which apprentice 
beauticians would put the heads, could serve not only as evidence that functional concerns did 
not influence the design, but also for the proposition that the chosen designs did not affect the 
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 Photograph of “Mara,” Pivot Point, 170 F.Supp.2d 828, 840 (N.D.Ill. 2001) (image located in opinion, but no 
additional source information available). 
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 As the dissent pointed out, 372 F.3d at 933, the majority’s standard seems closer to an idea/expression merger 
inquiry than to a separability test.  Cf. Copyright Office Compendium, supra, 924.2(C), ruling irrelevant “the fact 







 Many decisions addressing the conceptual separability of a useful article’s entire form 
from its function focus on the role that utilitarian concerns played in the shaping of the article’s 
appearance.  In Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,
100
 a majority of the Second 
Circuit rejected copyright protection for a stylized bicycle rack (pictured below)
101
 on the ground 
that the object’s functional objectives motivated the designer’s choices.  The designer had altered 
the structure’s shape in order better to accommodate the parking of bicycles; the resulting 
“fusion” of form and function proved fatal to the copyright claim.   
 
While the RIBBON [bicycle] Rack may be worthy of admiration for its aesthetic qualities 
alone, it remains nonetheless the product of industrial design. Form and function are 
inextricably intertwined in the rack, its ultimate design being as much the result of 
utilitarian pressures as aesthetic choices. Indeed, the visually pleasing proportions and 
symmetricality of the rack represent design changes made in response to functional 
concerns. Judging from the awards the rack has received, it would seem in fact that 
Brandir has achieved with the RIBBON Rack the highest goal of modern industrial 
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 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
101
 Jane C. Ginsburg, Photographs of Stylized Bicycle Rack (2016). 
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Inquiries into the designer’s motivation of course encourage revisionist recollection to 
purge aesthetic choices of any functional influence, as Judge Winter pointed out in dissent.
103
  
                                                          
103
 Id. at 1151.  Accord, Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1350 (1987) 
(“How are we to verify the impulses that guided a designer's hand?  Must we take her testimony in every disputed 
case?”); Perlmutter, supra, 37 J. Copyr. Soc. at 373-73 (discussing problems with motivation anlaysis); Viva Moffat, 




The design-choice approach also raises the question of whether decisions which affect a useful 
article’s shape, but in a manner that, rather than maximizing utility in fact undermines it, would 
be conceptually separable.  For example, a table top in the shape of an amoeba would be visually 
striking, but probably functionally suboptimal, since its unusual shape would diminish both 
useful surface area and ease of placement in a room. 
 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the design-process approach, it appears to be the 
preferred mode of analysis of many courts and commentators.  Courts and commentators ask if 
“artistic judgment [was] exercised independently of functional influences.”
104
 It is not clear, 
however, at least as to some commentators, how “independent” of functional “influence” the 
design choices must be.  The required liberation appears to range from complete independence to 
choices that take into account but are not “dictated by” functional constraints.
105
  The latter 
approach welcomes more designs into copyright, and therefore might seem more consonant with 
the general goal of the copyright system to encourage creativity, but it is in tension with the 
specific statutory standard and legislative history.  The “not dictated by” standard is inconsistent 
with Congress’ rejection of a new monopoly regime of protection for applied art, even one more 
limited than copyright.  The abandoned Title II of the 1976 Copyright Act would have protected 
a design whose form was not “dictated solely by a utilization function of the article that 
embodies it.”
106
 If this would have been the test for the lesser form of protection that Congress 
chose not to enact (in part out of concern for anticompetitive consequences), it seems particularly 
inappropriate to adopt it for full-on copyright protection.
107
  Accordingly, under the statute as 
enacted, copyright should be denied even if utilitarian imperatives furnished only one of the 
considerations informing the overall design of the useful article.  Separability, conceptual or 




There remains the problem of proving the process.  As suggested earlier, to ask the 
designer “what were you thinking when you chose this shape” invites disingenuousness.  A   
more objective approach would inquire what instructions the designer (if hired to create the 
useful article) received with respect to the relationship of form and function.  The Seventh 
Circuit in Pivot Point assigned considerable relevance to the commissioning party’s having 
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 See, e.g., Brandir, supra; Pivot Point, supra; Universal Furniture, supra; Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 
500 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir. 2012) (prom dresses).  See generally Robert Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial 
Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Minnesota Law Review 707, 740-47 (1983) 
(proposing to distinguish “applied art from industrial design by examining the extent to which utilitarian 
considerations influence artistic expression,” id. at 743). 
105
 See Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 484-85, quoting Note, Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing 
Debate Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 141-42 (2008). 
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 S. Rep. 94-473, Title II, Sec. 202(d) (1975). 
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 The 1998 Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2905, which added chapter 
13, “Protection of Original Designs” to title 17, protects boat hull designs unless the design is “dictated solely by a 
utilitarian function of the article that embodies it.” 17 U.S.C. sec. 1302(4).  Like the unenacted Title II, Chapter 13 
of the copyright act requires notice, registration, and affords protection for ten years from registration.  For the 
moment, however, the only “original designs” Chapter 13 protects are boat hulls. 
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 See, e.g., Aqua Creations United States, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31982, 98 
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1471, 2011 WL 1239793 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011), aff’d., 487 Fed. Appx. 627 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Aqua must plead facts permitting the Court to find that the design represents purely aesthetic choices, as opposed 
to ‘a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations.’ Brandir [Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 
1142 (2d Cir. 1987)] at 1145.”). 
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“given carte blanche” to the designer, apart from specifying the non-utilitarian goal that the 
model heads exhibit a “hungry look.”
109
   
 
 More objective still would be to assess whether the overall form achieves utilitarian 
purposes.  But that approach foregoes inquiry into how the work was created, in order to focus 
on the form/function relationship in the resulting useful article.  The test seeks to determine 
whether the object’s form affects its utilitarian function: would the article function differently 
were it shaped differently?
110
  If the answer to that question is “no,” then the object’s form and 
function are not “capable of existing separately” from each other.  Importantly, the capacity for 
separate existence pertains to the useful article as designed, not to whether a useful article of its 
kind, for example, a chair, could still serve for seating were it designed differently.  The latter 
inquiry would revert to an idea/expression analysis of whether a multiplicity of forms might 
fulfill the general function of the useful article.  But, as earlier observed, that generous approach 




To ask whether a useful article’s form “affects” its utilitarian function will almost 
certainly disqualify the overall shape of most useful articles, even though that shape may be 
aesthetically innovative and pleasing.  One might think that result inconsistent with copyright’s 
general goal to promote artistic creativity.  But it is important to recall that useful articles do not 
fit comfortably within copyright’s long duration, broad scope, and freedom from formalities.  
Congress therefore determined to preclude copyright protection for most useful articles, albeit 
leaving some room for individual design “features.”  If that room accommodates the overall form 
of few if any useful articles, that outcome is an intended consequence.  As we have seen, 
attempts to enlarge the category of “conceptually separable” forms to encompass shapes that 
affect utilitarian function produce inconsistent standards that guide neither lower courts nor the 
practitioners and purveyors of industrial design.   
 
 The following precepts emerge: aesthetic merit is not to be confused with separability; 
separability is a standard more restrictive than “idea/expresssion merger”; and conceptual 
separability, to the extent it applies at all to the overall form of a useful article, requires the 
complete disenfranchisement of form from function, so that the form is “wholly unnecessary” to 
the function.
111
  If a change in overall form would cause the article to function differently, then 
the form is not “separable.”  More radically, one might eschew “conceptual” separability, and 
return to the statutory requirements that the useful article contain “features” that can be 
“identified separately” and are “capable of existing independently” from the article’s utilitarian 
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 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 931-32.  
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 See, e.g., Ochre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture, Planning & Design, P.C., 530 Fed. Appx. 19 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(lighting fixture design not separable because it “‘reflect[s] a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations,’ 
insofar as the aesthetic choices made by Ochre in the design of the chandeliers are necessarily intertwined with the 
need of the fixture to fulfill its function of lighting the hotel rooms”); Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 
413 F.3d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[O]ne may not copyright the general shape of a lamp, because its overall shape 
contributes to its ability to illuminate the reaches of a room.”). 
111
 Varsity Brands, supra at 488.  Some bottle designs may offer one example.  The shape of the container may be 
irrelevant to spray or pump-action bottles if the tube retrieves liquid from the bottom of the container whatever 
bottle’s shape. On the other hand, the overall form may further other utilitarian objectives, such as ease of grasping. 
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aspects.  If the design of a separately identifiable element affects the article’s function, it does 
not exist independently, rather, it is integrated into the article’s utilitarian aspects.  If the design 
at issue envelopes the entire form of the article, the task of identifying separate design features 
becomes more daunting since the statutory term “features” suggests some subset of the article, 
not its entire form.   
 
Nonetheless, if one assesses the design’s capacity for existence independently of the 
article’s utilitarian aspects, there may be circumstances in which one might imagine an intact 
version of the entire design detached from the article, in effect separating the goods into a useful 
article on the one hand, and a PGS work “reproduced in or on” the useful article on the other.
112
  
In other words, section 113(a) may supply the sword that cuts through the tangle of 
“separability” caselaw.  The following section demonstrates how section 113(a) can provide 
indirect protection to some overall designs of useful articles when those articles derive from pre-
existing PGS works.   The discussion then inquires whether a design of a useful article might 
enjoy direct copyright protection under a separability analysis that imagines that the design of a 
useful article had initially been the design of a PGS work .  
 
 
Coda and Paradox: Indirect copyright protection for some industrial design? 
 
  If the design of an extant PGS work were subsequently adopted as the shape of a useful 
article, for example, the Mazer statuettes or the hypothetical crocodile sculpture, separability 
analysis should not apply at all, because the scope of protection for a PGS work extends to its 
reproduction “in or on” a useful article.  If the designer of the Brandir bicycle rack had not 
modified his original wire sculpture in order to adapt it into a better functioning parking structure 
for bicycles, but had instead left it as a work of abstract sculpture, then the wire structure would 
have remained a sculptural work, and its unauthorized reproduction, whether as a sculpture or 
enlarged into a bicycle rack, might have violated the sculptor’s copyright.
113
  In this variation on 
Brandir, changing the form of the sculpture to reproduce it as a bicycle rack would have affected 
the article’s function, but that result does not matter if the separability test does not apply to the 
underlying wire sculpture in the first place. The copyright lies in the sculpture (assuming it is 
minimally original), not in the bicycle rack; the sculptor’s copyright entitles him to authorize or 
prohibit bicycle racks based on the sculpture because the rack is a reproduction of the sculpture 
“in or on” a useful article.  Thus, had another designer, seeing the original wire sculpture, 
perceived the sculpture’s potential to serve as a bicycle rack, and then redesigned the sculpture, 
introducing the changes needed to make the sculpture a better bicycle rack, infringement analysis 
would inquire if the altered structure were substantially similar to the first designer’s PGS work.  
If the original form remained recognizable notwithstanding the changes introduced (which might 
not be the case depending on the extent of the modifications), the substantial similarity test 
should be met, and the underlying sculpture would be infringed. 
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 This approach is consistent with the standard adopted in the Copyright Office Compendium, supra, 924.2(B). 
113
 This analysis is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in D.C. Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9
th
 Cir. 
2015) in which the court, having ruled the “Batmobile” a protectable character, held its copyright infringed by 
defendant’s full-size replicas.  
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 This observation leads to a paradox: it suggests that producers of artistically-designed 
useful articles should first create non-useful sculptures, register them as such, and then convert 
them to useful articles.  That the conversion may introduce changes needed to adapt the sculpture 
into a useful article does not matter because the protected work remains the sculpture, not its 
utilitarian adaptation. By contrast, as we have seen, if the claimed work were the design of the 
useful article, the design’s responsiveness to functional objectives would disqualify it from 
copyright protection.  Consider the amoeba-shaped tabletop posited earlier.  If a designer first 
sculpts an amoeba-shaped slab, then, under section 113(a) of the Copyright Act, she would have 
exclusive rights to license its reproduction, inter alia, as a tabletop.  By contrast, our earlier 
analysis indicated that if the amoeba shape had been a tabletop ab initio it would be both a useful 
article and inseparable because any differently-shaped table top would function differently (even 




The divergent outcomes seem a product of pure formalism.  Consider the application of 
the two-step “first-a-sculpture, then-a-useful-article” approach
115




                                                          
114
 Arguably, the tabletop might be considered separable under the “superimposition” test, which imagines a basic 
tabletop lurking under the amoeba shape, like the functional belt-buckle frame under the decorative covering in 
Kieselstein-Cord, but unlike the belt-buckle covers, the amoeba shape affects the functioning of the table.  
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features.  The amoeba table-top may be a sculpture in its own right, but a table without its top is not a table.  Of 
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 Cf. Universal Furniture v. Collezione Europa, supra at 434 (reflecting judicial approval of this process in 
reverse: the designer first designed the useful parts of the furniture, and then in a separate step designed the artistic 
flourishes). 
116
 Complaint, Heptagon Creations, Ltd. v. Core Group Marketing LLC, 2011 WL 6600267 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (no. 






In the actual litigation,
117
 the court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to plead with particularity 
which elements of the item were conceptually separable and why.  According to the prevailing 
caselaw, if the designer had created the outer shell of the item in order to serve as the base and 
arms of a chair, the overall shape would not be separable, even though the seat could be lifted off 
and exchanged with some other seat, because the remaining elements still serve functional 
purposes.  The same result would apply under the test that inquires whether the design of the 
article affects its utilitarian aspects: the seating function of the chair would change were the 
height of the arms or their distance from the seat altered, therefore the design elements or the 
outer shell are not “capable of existing independently of” the utilitarian aspects of the chair.   
 
But if the designer had first created the hollowed tree trunk-like external shell as a 
sculptural form in its own right, then the subsequent addition of the seating element would not 
deprive the underlying sculpture of copyright protection. 
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As a result, the sculptor would have had a copyright infringement claim against an unlicensed 
furniture designer who adopted the shell for seating.  Moreover, the sculptor’s protection would 
40 
 
extend to the reproduction of the sculpture with any kind of seating, or, for that matter, as any 
other kind of useful article, such as the table that might result from turning the shell upside 
down.  
 
 By way of further illustration, consider Constantin Brancusi’s iconic sculpture, Bird in 
Space (pictured below, left).
118
 The image on the right is the same famous sculpture rotated 90 
degrees, reimagined as a bench. Application of the two-step creation process – first, design Bird 
in Space as a sculpture, second, license the form for use as a bench – results in indirect protection 
of the overall design of the bench. Had the same bench not been based on a pre-existing 
sculpture, however, it would not enjoy a copyright: the bench is undoubtedly a useful article, and 





 Now suppose a furniture designer took additional steps to change the bench into a 
comfortable couch by affixing three cushions.
119
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 David Heald, Photograph of Bird in Space by Constantin Brancusi, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-
york/collections/collection-online/artwork/669. 
119
 Ikea Malinda Chair Cushion (image), http://www.ikea.com/us/en/catalog/products/70307841/ (no additional 






Whether a bench or a cushioned couch, both useful articles come within the scope of Brancusi’s 
copyright in the sculptural work, as section 113(a) affirms.  By contrast, if the form had initially 
been created to serve as a bench, and even had the original shape of the bench been deemed 
“separable” under the design process analysis because (hypothetically) no utilitarian 
considerations informed the original bench design, once the designer modified the shape to adapt 
it to the utilitarian task of seating, that alteration would, according to prevailing caselaw, have 
excluded the overall form from characterization as a PGS work.  
 
One might distinguish these outcomes by pointing out that the two-step approach does 
not yield copyright protection for the useful article, only for the underlying sculpture on which 
the useful article is based.  In practice, however, this distinction may be without a meaningful 
difference, because the designer of the useful article could obtain an exclusive license from the 
sculptor, thus giving her enforceable rights against competing designers of useful articles.   
 
The paradox prompts two responses.  First, throw up one’s hands: these results do not 
make sense, but they are the best we can do given the intractable statutory separability 
standard.
120
  Attempts to construct a coherent conceptual separability (or separate identifiability 
+ independent existence) standard regarding the overall shape of a useful article may be doomed 
to failure.  Even the rigorous approach that excludes the form of articles that would function 
differently were they shaped differently will in some instances buckle under the two-step design 
process approach.  
 
Second, and alternatively, one might reason backwards from the two-step paradox:  
embracing the paradox might provide a means to introduce some greater flexibility into the 
conceptual separability (or separate identifiability + independent existence) test to accommodate 
not only superfluous flourishes, but also all or most of the shape of some useful articles, without 
slipping into sliding-scale evaluations of the proportionate influence of aesthetic versus 
utilitarian considerations in the design process.  Recall that some of the separability cases could 
have been recharacterized as instances of preexisting PGS works (not themselves useful articles) 
reproduced “in or on” or adapted to useful articles, such as floorboards and cheerleading 
uniforms.
121
  An alternative separability test would ascertain separability by inquiring whether 
the form could be conceptualized as a preexisting PGS work reproduced “in or on” a useful 
article.
122
  If so, then the design would be a protectable PGS work regardless of birth order. 
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 For an approach that would eschew the “separability” criterion, see, e.g., Goldstein, supra, at sec. 2.5.3(c) 
(suggesting that doctrines of originality and functionality would sufficiently limit universe of protectable applied 
art). 
121
 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC and Home Legend v. Mannington Mills, supra. 
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 This approach differs somewhat from that proposed in Judge Newman’s Carol Barnhart dissent: “the article must 




This reverse section 113(a) approach works well for discrete decorative items that one 








But it might also cover more.  Abstract forms such as the Heptagon outer shells, the amoeba-
shaped tabletop, or the hypothetical Brancusi bench, can also be conceived as pre-existing 
sculptures adapted into a useful article (even if in fact those shapes had been created to serve as a 
useful article).  Reversing the “birth order” to imagine that the pictorial, graphic or sculptural 
design is a freestanding work whose existence precedes the creation of the useful article thus 
could bring not only individual design elements within the sphere of separability, but also the 
overall form of at least some useful articles.  We can nonetheless posit that not every shape of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
. . the requisite ‘separateness’ exists whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two different 
concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.” 773 F.2d at 422.  Unlike Judge Newman’s test, it would 
not be necessary for the aesthetic character of the form to “displace” the identification of the form as utilitarian.  The 
approach this article considers more closely resembles that advocated by Perlmutter, supra, 37 J. Copyr. Soc. at 376: 
“If a copyrightable work of art remains copyrightable when it is later incorporated into a useful article, reversing the 
sequence of events and starting with its appearance in the useful article should not make the same work 
uncopyrightable”; id. at 377-78 (advocating a “duality” over a “displacement” approach to conceptual separability).  
122




useful article lends itself to this kind of reimagining; most forms will be seen as the useful 
articles they are; the conceptual reverse-engineering approach applies only to forms that can be 
seen as depicting an item (non utilitarian or otherwise) that is not the same utilitarian article.
124
   
 
For reimagined “sculptures” that depict the same kind of useful article, section 113(b) 
warns that “This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful 
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of 
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law . . .”
 125
 Thus, 
Claes Oldenburg’s monumental sculptures of everyday items such as clothespins, baseball bats, 
and trowels,
126
 do not give Oldenburg a monopoly in the everyday item.  By the same token, the 
depiction of a useful article such as a chair does not confer on the creator of the two-dimensional 
drawing or three-dimensional model of the chair the exclusive right to reproduce the chair.
127
  In 
other words, there is no two-step path to chair copyrightability by first drawing a picture of the 
chair.  René Magritte’s painting The Treachery of Images, captioned “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” 
(“This is not a pipe”)
128
 helpfully instructs: Magritte has made a picture of a pipe.  It is a pictorial 
work.  Magritte’s heirs enjoy the exclusive right in the U.S. to reproduce that image on t-shirts, 
umbrellas, etc.   
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For example, modernist form-follows-function designs would remain uncopyrightable, notwithstanding their 
aesthetic appeal, because the perfect integration of form and function defies conceptual reverse engineering into 
anything other than a pictorial or sculptural representation of a chair, etc.  The marriage of form and function would 
probably also disqualify the furniture design on grounds of functionality under section 102(a). 
Moreover, the sculpture that emerges from the conceptual reverse engineering may lack the requisite originality.  
For example, the Brandir sine curve shape or the rudimentary form of the Carol Barnhart torsos might be 
considered too banal even under a generous standard of originality. 
125
 17 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). 
126
 See e.g., http://oldenburgvanbruggen.com/largescaleprojects/lsp.htm (includes photographs of clothespin, 
baseball bat, trowel, and other large-scale depictions of ordinary objects). 
127
 See, e.g., Niemi v. American Axle Mfg., 2006 WL 2077590 (E.D.Mich. 2006) (unauthorized manufacturing of a 
machine based on copyrighted technical drawing is not infringement). 
128
 René Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1928-29); Photo Credit: C. Herscovici, Brussels; Copyright: 






But Magritte’s work is not an actual, functioning pipe (indeed, that is the point of the painting).  
Under section 113(b), producing smoking paraphernalia that looks like Magritte’s representation 
of a pipe will not infringe Magritte’s copyright unless the pipe represented by Magritte included 
decorative elements distinct from the smoking article function.  For example, had he adorned the 
bowl with some fanciful details, such as shaping its surface to resemble a Belgian waffle,
129
 
those details might be deemed separable, and protectable, but the potential copyright coverage of 
the waffle-shaped bowl will not extend to the rest of the pipe; others remain free to base their 
pipes on Magritte’s image, sans waffle. 
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 “This is not a waffle-shaped pipe” by Robert E. Bishop, d’après Magritte.  Waffle photo credit: 







But Magritte’s work is not an actual, functioning pipe (indeed, that is the point of the painting).  
Under section 113(b), producing smoking paraphernalia that looks like Magritte’s representation 
of a pipe will not infringe Magritte’s copyright unless the pipe represented by Magritte included 
decorative elements distinct from the smoking article function.  For example, had he adorned the 





























The pipe Magritte in fact drew in The Treachery of Images lacks such flourishes; the 
bowl is unadorned and the curve of the shaft either lacks originality or in an actual shaft would 
affect the function of delivering tobacco smoke.  In the absence of fanciful, separately 
identifiable non functional details, section 113(b) reifies Magritte’s jest: a picture of a pipe is not 
an actual pipe; the copyright in a picture of a pipe is not a copyright in an actual pipe.
131
 




 Cf., Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding without reference to § 
113(b), that copyright in a two-dimensional work portraying a three-dimensional useful article—a shoe—does not 
confer an exclusive right to produce the article portrayed; the court observed that the distinction “brings to mind 
Magritte’s famous painting of a pipe: [Eliya’s two-dimensional rendition of the shoe] n’est pas une chaussure, but is 
merely a depiction of one”). 





By contrast, suppose an artist licenses a depiction of a useful article for reproduction in or 
on a different kind of useful article.  Suppose, for example, that Magritte had licensed the 
production of a coatrack with hooks in the shape of his depiction of a pipe.
 132
   
 
This kind of licensing is common for wallpaper or fabric designs for apparel or upholstery (think, 
for example, of aviation-themed children’s pajamas or curtains), and falls squarely within section 
113(a), not 113(b). Section 113(b) ensures that the author of “a work that portrays a useful article 
as such” has no greater rights in “the useful article so portrayed” than would the producer of that 
actual useful article.  But the useful articles “so portrayed” in the hypothetical fabric design are 
airplanes, not apparel; section 113(b) therefore does not deprive the artist who drew the airplane 
of the exclusive right to license the reproduction of her drawing as any non-aviation kind of 
useful article, including one in three dimensions, such as a throw pillow or a go-cart.  By the 
same token, since the useful article “so portrayed” in The Treachery of Images is a pipe, section 
113(b) therefore does not deprive Magritte’s heirs of the exclusive right to license Magritte’s 
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 Coatrack design by Nathalie Russell. 
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depiction of a pipe for reproduction in or on a different kind of useful article, such as hooks for a 
coatrack. 
 
Consider the 1970 “Joe chair,”
 133




The chair looks like a baseball mitt; the depiction of a baseball mitt is not a depiction of a chair.  
If the artist drew a baseball mitt, and someone else designed a chair to look like her depiction of 
a baseball mitt, then section 113(a), rather than 113(b), should apply.  In this situation, the 
sporting equipment function of the mitt has been “deactivated,”
134
 and there should be no 
difference between licensing a non representational form, such as the Heptagon shells,  for 
reproduction “in or on a useful article,” and licensing a form that depicts an object found in the 
natural world, such a banana (coincidentally similar to the hypothetical Brancusi couch),
135
 or a 
form that depicts any other article, useful or otherwise, for reproduction in or on a different kind 
of useful article. 
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 Thanks to Paolo Marzano for the term and for the concept. 
See also Cheffins v Stewart, 825 F.3d 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (McKeown, concurring) (discussing the difference 
between applied art and  “visual art” (for VARA coverage):  
Tracy Emin's My Bed, displayed at the Tate Britain, incorporates Emin's real bed as a “monument to the 
heartache of a relationship breakdown.” The bed arguably retains its original utilitarian function—it 
remains a bed, and could still be slept in—but it is no longer meant or used for this utilitarian purpose. 
Rather, My Bed is now appreciated and viewed as a work of creative expression and, when viewed as a 
whole, the utilitarian object has become part of a visual art piece. 
135
 Cushion Image: Ikea Malinda Chair Cushion (image), http://www.ikea.com/us/en/catalog/products/70307841/ 
(no additional source information available for image).  Banana Image: http://science-all.com/banana.html (no 




   
 
 
But section 113(a) will not make the licensed item of furniture copyrightable.  It gives the 
artist rights against furniture designers; it does not give furniture designers rights of their own 
(unless they acquire them from the artist).  For designers to enjoy their own copyrights in the 
overall form of a useful article, it is necessary to interpret the statutory criteria to apply to a 
design created for, rather than subsequently applied to, a useful article.  Reversing the design’s 
“birth order,” the question becomes whether the same design, if created to be a useful article, 
would lose the protection it would have enjoyed had it began life as a non utilitarian PGS 
work.
136
  As we have seen, the caselaw by and large disqualifies designs created ab initio to 
serve as useful articles when the design encompasses the entire form of the article, rather than a 
detachable flourish.  But perhaps thinking of separability as the flip side of section 113(a) can 
work for the useful article’s entire form, at least when the arbitrary quality of the depiction of a 
completely different article (useful or otherwise) relative to the resulting useful article might 
meet the statutory criteria of separate identification (banana; baseball mitt) and independent 
existence, at least if the superfluity of the design to the function
137
 betokened its independence.   
 
 Or consider a notorious example of artistic employment of a useful article: Marcel 
Duchamp’s 1917 “Fountain” (signed R. Mutt), which is not in fact a depiction of a urinal, but 
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 Arguably, any work of art can be converted to non-intellectual kinds of utility; Paul Goldstein posits using the 
Venus de Milo “as a mannequin for sleeveless blouses,” Goldstein supra, at sec. 2.5.3(a).  But the statutory 
definition of a “useful article” as “having an intrinsic utilitarian function” (emphasis supplied) should preclude the 
retroactive characterization of the article as “useful” if a third party later puts the article to non artistic use: the third 
party is conferring an extrinsic utilitarian function on the article.   
137
 See decisions cited supra, note 61. 
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Duchamp would lack copyright not only in any actual urinals copied from “Fountain,” but it is 
questionable whether “Fountain” itself would have been copyrightable, since Duchamp simply 
signed an actual, preexisting urinal.  Giving the “found object” a new context
139
 through the 
pseudonymous signature and the museum setting may be original in the artistic sense, but is a 
non protectable “idea” as a matter of copyright.
140
   
 
Now suppose a furniture designer, appreciating “Fountain”’s curved forms, copies the 
signed urinal but converts it into a chair:
141
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 Photo Credit: Brea Weinreb; Image located at: http://calibermag.org/articles/saying-goodbye-to-the-
sfmoma/duchamp-urinal/ 
139
 An unsigned editorial in the second issue of The Blind Man published on May 17, 1917, explains in support of 
Fountain: “He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title 
and point of view -created a new thought for that object.” The Richard Mutt Case, The Blind Man, May 1917, at 5, 
http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/dada/blindman/2/05.htm. (Duchamp may have written this editorial, and indeed later 
expressed his agreement with the editorial’s views. See Dawn Ades, Neil Cox & David Hopkins Marcel Duchamp, 
127 (1999). See also William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp Fountain (1989).)  
140
 See Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law Core, 36 (2012). 
141
 Urinal image located at: http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-t07573; urinal photo credit: no 
information available.  Chair legs image located at: http://www.ikea.com/us/en/catalog/products/S89874512/; photo 










Here, we have no “birth order” indirect copyright protection under section 113(a), since the 
underlying item was an actual useful object, not a depiction of a useful object.  Had “Fountain” 
instead been a representation of a urinal rather than an actual urinal (which would have defeated 
the artistic purpose), then Duchamp could under section 113(a) have enjoyed the exclusive right 
to license the reproduction of his representation in or on other kinds of useful articles.  (Though 
he could not have prevented third parties from creating their own representations of urinals, nor 
from going back to actual plumbing fixtures in order to convert them to different useful articles 
such as chairs.)  But under the reverse 113(a) approach suggested here, one could imagine the 
urinal-chair as a depiction of a urinal, and therefore as a protectable sculptural work “existing 




Ultimately, however, the potential copyrightability of these useful article designs may 
offer designers little solace because the scope of protection for such an article is likely to be 
extremely thin.  The designer cannot monopolize the idea of converting a particular useful (or 
other) article into an unrelated useful article.  Moreover, similarities between the products that 
are necessary to the expression of the common idea, including the realization of its functionality, 
will not be taken into account in assessing substantial similarity of copyrightable expression.  
Short of exact or near-exact copies, copyright will allow infinite unlicensed variations on banana 
couches or baseball mitt or urinal chairs.  As a result, one may argue that a reverse section 113(a) 
approach would be unlikely to harm the balance Congress endeavored to strike between 
copyright and free competition in aesthetically-designed useful articles, but for that reason 
neither is it likely to provide meaningful remedies to designers. 
 
The last proposition, however, is open to challenge.  Protection against exact copies may 
be all the designer seeks because her competitors are not making their own variations on a theme 
first essayed by the designer, they are creating “knock offs” of the precise design.
142
 The wider a 
reverse section 113(a) approach sweeps, the greater the risk that the distinction Congress sought 
to make between PGS works (protectable) and aesthetically-designed useful articles (generally 
not copyrightable as a whole, albeit potentially copyrightable as to parts) returns to the knot-
twisted muddle from which we started.  If the reverse section 113(a) approach works well in the 
context of distinct component part “features” of a useful article, it may ultimately be 
unconvincing as applied to the entire form of the article because it tends toward 
overinclusiveness.  If, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, “a chair is a chair is a chair,” so that the 
shapes of most useful articles should resist recharacterization as non useful PGS works, the 
universe of forms that effective advocates might conceptually convert to “sculptures,” could 
nonetheless prove ever-expanding.  Consider the following item:
143
 like the Brandir bicycle rack 
seen out of context, this object is not obviously a useful article, in this case a chair (hence it 
might pass Judge Newman’s “displacement” version of the separability test).  It does not require 
great labor of the imagination to conceive of the “Tube Chair” as a sculpture.   
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 For one of many examples, see, e.g., http://www.modernclassics.com/products/buyers-guide-corbusier-
chairs.html?utm_campaign=G201&utm_content=B1-00&gclid=CL6psOKFzM4CFcxahgodXssBxw (inexpensive 
reproductions of Le Corbusier chairs, with chart comparing copies and originals). 
143







Or the Sori Yanagi “Butterfly Stool”
144
 (1954), as its name suggests, could be conceptualized as 
an abstract representation of a butterfly: 
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Or, the Le Corbusier “LC2” armchair (1928)
145
 looks more like a chair and less like an abstract 
form than the earlier two examples, but could nonetheless be imagined as a sculpture of an 




Other examples likely abound, some more, some less obviously at first blush a piece of furniture 
or other useful article, but all of them arguably capable of being imagined as non useful works of 
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  Image source: http://www.cassina.com/en/collection/sofas-and-armchairs/lc2-maison-la-roche  
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art.  Sadly, then, for the attempt to forge a path to copyright coverage of innovative and attractive 
furniture and other useful article designs, the reverse section 113(a) interpretation of the statutory 
definition of a PGS work this article has ventured for overall designs of useful articles presents 
two daunting risks: either a run down the slippery slope, or, to halt that slide, judicial resort to a 
gut sense of whether or not the disputed object is “art.” 
 
 To sum up, what I have called the reverse section 113(a) approach, which inquires 
whether the claimed “feature” could be imagined as an independent PGS work reproduced in or 
on a useful article, can help us determine whether a part of the design of a useful article “can be 
identified separately from and is capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.”  The approach might also successfully apply to designs that make up the whole or 
most of the shape of the useful article, particularly the more the shape, whether figurative or 
abstract, can be perceived as a form unrelated to the useful article.  The unexpected character of 
the form could make it separately identifiable and its arbitrariness relative to the function
146
 
could render it capable of existing independently.   But the independent existence criterion 
means that aesthetically pleasing designs in which the form affects the function will remain 
outside the scope of protection, thus excluding a great deal of modernist and similarly stripped-
down design.  As a result, this approach to separability will not fully correct the law’s current 
bias toward protecting the ornate over the austere.  Moreover, as we have seen, the approach in 
practice is likely often to present intractable problems of line-drawing, and for that reason may 
well prove unworkable.  
 
Congress should untie the knot  
 
 Attempts to apply the statutory tests of separate identification and capacity for 
independent existence to the overall designs of useful articles have yielded a plethora of 
interpretations, but predictable and even-handed treatment of applied art continues to elude 
courts and creators.  It may well be time for Congress to revisit the question.  Happily, the 
solution need not demand extensive Congressional intervention, because a statutory framework 
already exists in Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act, added in 1998, establishing “Protection of 
original designs.”
147
  Chapter 13 largely tracks the abandoned Title II of the 1976 Copyright 
Act,
148
 covering original designs of useful articles for a ten-year term following registration, if 
registration occurs within two years of the date on which the design is first made public.
149
  The 
statute excludes coverage for unoriginal or commonplace designs, as well as for those “dictated 
solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it,”
150
 thus welcoming designs that 
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 An apparently arbitrary design might nonetheless present functional characteristics, for example, if its shape 
responded to objectives of stress-tolerance or load-bearing.  The intertwining of form and function would preclude 
separate existence for the form. 
147
 Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, title V of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860, 2905 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§1301-1332). 
148
 See supra, note 33. 
149
 17 U.S.C. secs. 1301, 1305, 1310.  There is also a notice requirement, see id. secs. 1306, 1307. 
150
 Id., § 1302. Designs not subject to protection 
Protection under this chapter shall not be available for a design that is — 
(1) not original;  
(2) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, a familiar symbol, an emblem, or a motif, 
or another shape, pattern, or configuration which has become standard, common, prevalent, or ordinary;  
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accommodate the article’s function, so long as utilitarian considerations do not exclusively 
influence design choices.  This “not dictated by” standard encompasses a broader range of full 
article designs than would most interpretations of the statutory separability test for PGS works.  
The scope of protection prohibits the making or distribution of copies that are “substantially 





 Chapter 13 thus would offer a ready-made design protection regime, were it not for its 
definition of a useful article, which currently is limited to vessel hulls.
152
  But the origins of this 
legislation in special pleading from the Florida and California boat-building industries
153
 need 
not preclude its revision into a genuine design protection statute.  Indeed, bills (so far unenacted) 
to extend intellectual property protection to fashion design have taken Chapter 13 as their 
starting points.
154
  To bring the design of a broader range of useful articles within statutory 
coverage, a few modest amendments to Chapter 13 would suffice. 
 
First, the initial declaration that “The designer or other owner of an original design of a 
useful article which makes the article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or 
using public may secure the protection provided by this chapter upon complying with and subject 
to this chapter”
155
 could remain, albeit preferably without the requirement that the design be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(3) different from a design excluded by paragraph (2) only in insignificant details or in elements which are 
variants commonly used in the relevant trades;  
(4) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it; or 
(5) embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer or owner in the United States or a 
foreign country more than 2 years before the date of the application for registration under this chapter. 
151
 Id. § 1308. Exclusive rights 
The owner of a design protected under this chapter has the exclusive right to — 
(1) make, have made, or import, for sale or for use in trade, any useful article embodying that design; and 
(2) sell or distribute for sale or for use in trade any useful article embodying that design. 
Id. § 1309(e): 
(e) Infringing Article Defined. — As used in this section, an “infringing article” is any article the design 
of which has been copied from a design protected under this chapter, without the consent of the owner of 
the protected design. An infringing article is not an illustration or picture of a protected design in an 
advertisement, book, periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, motion picture, or similar medium. A 
design shall not be deemed to have been copied from a protected design if it is original and not 
substantially similar in appearance to a protected design. 
152
 Id. § 1301(b)(2). 
153
  See, e.g., U.S. Copyright Office. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices sec. 1302 (3d ed. 2014) 
(“Vessel design protection is not a form of copyright protection. Congress enacted the VHDPA to provide a new, 
separate form of special protection for vessel designs in response to the needs of the boat industry, not as an 
amendment to the copyright law.”);  Susanna Monseau, The Challenge of Protecting Industrial Design in a Global 
Economy, 20 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 495, 535 (2012) (“[The VHDPA] came about because the Supreme Court struck 
down a Florida statute protecting boat hulls on the basis of federal preemption, and once boat designers were 
prevented from using state unfair competition laws to protect their designs they lobbied Congress for federal 
protection of boat hull designs.”). 
154
 See, e.g., S.3523 - Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, 112th Congress, 2d. sess. (2012) available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/3523?q=S.3523+ ; S. Rep. 112-259, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/112th-congress/senate-report/259/1?q=S.3523+.  See generally Scott 
Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147 (2009). See also 
Susan Scafidi, IDPPPA: Introducing the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, a.k.a. Fashion 
Copyright, Counterfeit Chic (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2010/08. 
155
 Id. § 1301(a)(1). 
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“attractive to the purchasing or using public.”  The introduction of a merit standard is 
troublesome, given copyright law’s traditional rejection of inquiries into artistic worthiness.
156
  
Admittedly, Chapter 13 establishes a sui generis design protection regime that borrows from 
other intellectual property regimes as well as from copyright.  For example, distinctiveness is a 
characteristic of trademarks,
157
 and a requirement that the design stand out from its predecessors 
is not an unreasonable means of limiting the universe of protectable designs.  On the other hand, 
Chapter 13 already captures that restriction in its list of excluded designs, which denies coverage 
not only to unoriginal or banal designs, but also to a design “different from a design excluded [as 
banal or commonplace] . . . only in insignificant details or in elements which are variants 
commonly used in the relevant trades.”  In any event, the Copyright Office does not appear to 
view attractiveness or distinctiveness as conditions of protection; neither registration Form D-
VH,
158
 nor the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices
159
 allude to, much less implement, 
any requirement that the applicant demonstrate that the design is attractive or distinctive to the 
purchasing public. 
 
Second, and similarly, the amendment would largely retain the first part of the current 
definition, which specifies that “a design is ‘original’ if it is the result of the designer's creative 
endeavor that provides a distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to similar articles 
which is more than merely trivial and has not been copied from another source.”
160
  To make 
clear that originality is not limited to providing a distinguishable variation on prior designs, but 
can also refer to creative designs not based on prior designs, it might be desirable to revise the 
phrase to read “a design is ‘original’ if it is the result of the designer's creative endeavor, 
including one that provides a distinguishable variation . . .” (emphasis supplied).   
 
Finally, the definition of a “useful article” could reprise the definition in section 101 of 
the Copyright act.
161
  Several limiting factors, some of them already in the statute, could assuage 
fears that such a broad definition would result in overprotection of utilitarian design.  For one 
thing, not every design of a useful article will qualify.  Threshold criteria in Chapter 13 set the 
level of creativity and exclude designs dictated by functional objectives.  Legitimate concerns 
may nonetheless arise regarding subject matter that would cross the statutory threshold but 
whose protection would entail unacceptably anticompetitive consequences.  Spare parts for 
automobiles and other devices may well fall into this category.  To confront the problem of 
potential overprotection, Congress would need to choose between two approaches.  It could 
expand the universe of protectable designs piecemeal from vessel hulls to specifically identified 
kinds of useful articles, for example, furniture, or apparel, or handbags, leaving all other kinds of 
designs uncovered.  Or it could adopt an encompassing definition of protectable subject matter 
while excluding specified categories, such as spare parts in general, or the designs of motor 
vehicles in particular. 
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 Supra, secs. 1300-1305. 
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 Id. § 1301(b)(1). 
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 “A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance 





Congress would also need to determine whether a claimant may cumulate forms of 
intellectual property protection.  Currently, Chapter 13 requires a claimant to elect between 
vessel hull protection and design patent.
162
  By contrast, Chapter 13 allows for the coexistence of 
copyright and design protection; the latter for the shape of the vessel hull as a whole, the former 
for particular design components.
163
  Amending Chapter 13 to cover a broader range of useful 
articles need not alter that result, so long as it remained clear that copyright protection was 
limited to “features,” i.e., separable parts of the design of the useful article, rather than its 
entirety.  Copyright should not provide a backup extension of protection for the entire design of a 




The 1976 Copyright Act and its legislative history adopt a restrictive standard that 
embraces individual design features while largely excluding the overall form of useful articles.  
Yet, under section 113(a), if the design previously existed as a freestanding original work of art, 
its application to or incorporation in the overall form of a useful article would not deprive the 
preexisting PGS work of copyright protection.  The resulting useful article will enjoy indirect 
copyright protection in whole or in part by virtue of the copyright in the underlying PGS work.  
Interpreting the statutory separability test to mirror the section 113(a) exclusive right of the 
author of a PGS work to reproduce that work in or on a useful article offers an effective way to 
discern separability of particular design elements, but proves more problematic in the case of the 
form of the article as a whole.  While limiting the reverse section 113(a) analysis to discrete 
design “features” better hews to the statute, it nonetheless leaves us with the paradox of the 
disparate treatment of pre-existing artworks applied to useful articles relative to artistic designs 
created as useful articles.   
 
Because the statutory separate identifiability + independent existence standard best 
accommodates individual design features that are superfluous to the article’s function, it 
arguably privileges design frivolity over sobriety, excrescence over simplicity, often disfavoring 
the cleaner elegance that may appeal to exponents of the modernist, “form follows function” 
aesthetic (and to at least some judges and law professors).  Accordingly, one may be sympathetic 
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to endeavors to interpret the statute to encompass a wider range of overall forms of useful 
articles.
164
  From the designer’s perspective, more capacious standards would be desirable, 
especially in the absence of a design protection regime such as exists in the European Union.
165
  
But that is the point: in the absence of the kind of specially-tailored coverage this article has 
proposed, Congress has determined that copyright, by and large, is not the appropriate vehicle.  
Thus, the “separability” line Congress has drawn, albeit often difficult to discern coherently, 
places most overall designs of useful articles in the public domain. 
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